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to qualify, or he might induce his successor to renounce the office be-
fore qualification.
The second distinguishable aspect between-the two approaches is
that of constitutional and legislative construction. The majority
approach interprets literally the hold over provision of a state con-
stitution or statute. It is interpreted as preventing the development
of a vacancy, and of requiring the successor to be chosen by the same
mode as the incumbent.23 This prevents a governor whose appoint-
ments are subject to legislative confirmation from delaying appoint-
ments until the legislature has adjourned. 24 On the other hand the
minority approach follows the intention of the framers of applicable
constitutions and statutes.25 The primary aim of a hold over pro-
vision is to insure the presence of a person qualified to perform the
duties of the office during the short interval betwveen the expiration
of a term and the assumption of duties by the successor.26 If the
draftsmen had intended for an incumbent to hold over for another
term upon the failure of his successor to qualify, a special provision
would have been made.
Although the majority approach has several beneficial aspects,
the minority view gives more protection to the integrity of elective
offices and is more in accord with the spirit and purpose of the state
constitutions or statutes on the subject.
JAY FREDERICK WILKS
LIABILITY OF LAND POSSESSOR TO SOCIAL GUEST
The division of negligence into degrees-slight, ordinary, gross-
which was introduced into Anglo-American law in a 17o4 bailment
case,1 has never received general judicial approval.2 The concept,
'See Pitmann v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 190 S.E. 794 (1937).
'E.g., Shackelford v. West, 138 Ga. 164, 74 S.E. 1079 (1912).
"See Olmstead v. Augustus, 112 Ky. 365, 65 S.W. 817 (190).
"Hood v. Miller, 144 Okla. 88, 291 Pac. 504 (1930).
'The doctrine was borrowed from the Roman law by Chief Justice Holt in
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1704). See generally Green,
The Three Degrees of Negligence, 8 Am. L. Rev. 649 (1874); Elliot, Degrees of
Negligence, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933).
'Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 260 (1853); Denver & R.G.R.R.
v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 69 Pac. 578 (1902); City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153
I1. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Denny v. Chicago, R.I. & P Ry., 15o Iowa 460, 130
N.W. 363 (1911); Raymond v. Portland R.R., 100 Me. 529, 62 At. 6o2 (19o5);
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however, has survived by statute in special situations.3 Some twenty-
nine states, by statute or court decision, apply the doctrit-, limit
the liability of a motor vehicle operator to a guest.4 In these states
the guest generally may not recover unless the driver was guilty of
acts amounting to gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
Smith v. Alien,6 a recent decision from the Court of Appeals'for
the Fourth Circuit in a diversity action involving Virginia law ex-
panded this doctrine to cover the host's liability to a social guest.
Mrs. Smith was visiting her nephew, Mr. Allen, when she received
leg injuries as a result of a fall caused by the collapse of a board in
a pier which was maintained and controlled by Allen. There was
evidence tending to show the board was rotten and that this fact
was known or should have been known by Allen. Allen was told by his
employee immediately prior to the accident of the defective condi-
tion of that part of the pier on which Mrs. Smith was injured. The
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, who had rested
without introducing any evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that while the plaintiff could recover only upon
a showing of gross negligence, there was sufficient evidence to go to
the jury on this issue.
Since this was a case of novel impression under Virginia law,7 the
Prosser, Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955). Most writers also have rejected the theory of
degrees of negligence. Harper, Law of Torts § 74 (x9g3); Salmond, Law of Torts §
121 (loth ed. 1945); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933);
Harper, Licensor-Licensee, Tweedledum-Tweedledee, 24 Conn. B. J. 123 (1951);
'These statutes generally apply the doctrine in situations involving bailment,
criminal negligence and contributory negligence. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1846 (ig3);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1151 (1956); N.D. Comp. Laws §§ 7280-7283 (1913); S.D.
Comp. Laws § 991 (1929); Wis. Stat. § 340.26 (1953). See note 4 infra.
'These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakato, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. For
a comprehensive and detailed analysis as to what is required to impose liability in
each of the above states see 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (196o).
"All of the states enumerated in note 4 supra require proof of gross negligence
or willful misconduct or both to enable the guest to recover. 27 Ins. Counsel J.
223 (196o).
0297 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. ig6i).
7Though Virginia has no cases dealing with the liability of a possessor of
land to a social guest there are several Virginia cases dealing with the general
class of licensees in the form of "tolerated intruders." Pettyjohn & Sons v. Basham,
126 Va. 72, ioa S.E. 813 (igig); Norfolk & W.R.R. v. DeBoard's Adm'r, 91 Va.
700, 22 S.E. 514 (1895); Nichols' Adm'r v. Washington, 0. & W.R.R., 83 Va. 99, 5
S.E. 171 (1887). There are dicta in cases dealing with business invitees which
suggests that the social guest might be given the status of an invitee. Richmond &
M. Ry. v. Moore's Adm'r, 94 Va. 493, 27 S.E. 70 (1897); Rayless Chain Stores,
Inc. v. DeJarnette, 163 Va. 938, 178 S.E. 34 (1935); see note 9 infra.
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court looked elsewhere for authority. The court followed the Re-
statement nomenclature of classifying the social guest, Mrs. Smith,
as a gratuitous licensee s rather than an invitee. 9 However, the court
rejected the Restatement rule of the liability of possessors of land to
gratuitous licensees which imposes liability on the host where he
knows of a dangerous condition and fails to warn the guest or to use
reasonable care to make the condition safe. 10 This rule, based pri-
marily on ordinary negligence, was discarded in favor of the gross
negligence rule. In reaching this result the court said:
"[W]e cannot overlook the analogy between this situation and
that of a guest passenger in the automobile of another.""
The Virginia guest statute, which codifies earlier Virginia deci-
sions,' 2 limits the liability to a guest of the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle to situations involving gross negligence or wanton and
wilful conduct.'3 Inherent in the Virginia statute and other "guest"
statutes and judicial decisions which have adopted this rule is the
premise that the recipient of gratuitous hospitality should be allowed
to recover from his host only if the host was guilty of something more
than ordinary negligence. 14 Thus, since the benefit runs only to the
6A gratuitous licensee enters the land with the possessor's consent but not
necessarily by his invitation. Only the consent distinguishes him from a trespasser.
Restatement, Torts § 341 (1934); Prosser, Torts § 77 (2d ed. 1955).
9In order to qualify as an invitee the visitor must offer some potential pe-
cuniary benefit to the host, or, at least, enter the premises under an invitation which
expressly or impliedly represents that reasonable care has been exercised to make
the premises safe. Restatement, Torts §§ 332, 343, comment a (1934); Prosser,
Torts § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
"The rule provides that "a possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if,
but only if he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk
to them and has reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or
realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exer-
csing reasonable care (i) to make the condition safe, or (ii) to warn them of
the condition and the risk involved therein." Restatement, Torts § 342 (1934).
11297 F.2d at 24o.
"Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63 (1932); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30,
i6o S.E. 77 (1931). In 1938 Virginia passed a statute codifying the rule laid down
in these decisions. Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (195o). See note 13 infra.
"The statute stipulates that a guest may recover from the host driver only if
injury was caused "from the gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard
of the safety of the person or property of the person being so transported on
the part of such owner or operator." Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950).
1Aragona v. Parrella, 325 Mass. 583, 91 N.E.2d 778 (195o); Scheibel v. Lipton,
156 Ohio St. 3o8, 1o2 N.E.2d 453 (i95i); Solterer v. Kiss, 193 Va. 695, 70 S.E.2d 329
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guest, the host's duty toward him should be correspondingly less
than it would be in the ordinary situation.15 Also some cour" -it the
problem as one involving assumption of the risk, pointing ,at that
the guest should occupy a position equal to that of the host 6 family.16
It appears that the basic philosophy is simply that one should not be
quick to sue a friend for damages.
At first blush, the rationale appears equitable and just; but, is the
host's hospitality worth absolving him from liability in all cases where
he merely negligently injures the guest? Moreover, favors are re-
turned so that the host may be in the process of returning a favor
when the guest is injured. Is it fair, in any event, to classify the social
guest invited partly for business purposes with the social guest in-
vited for friendship only? It is hard to conceive of a situation in which
the host does not receive or expect to receive some benefit from the
presence of the guest, be it only his desire to accommodate a friend.
In any event if the hospitality received by the injured guest is com-
pletely gratuitous such hospitality is unlikely to be of such magni-
tude as to justify excusing the host from all wrongdoing short of gross
negligence. It is to some extent true that the social companion should
not be quick to sue a good friend. But, in most cases in which suit
is brought, the host will have insurance in which case the proceeding
loses much of its adversary character and the basic reason for the gross
negligence rule fails.'
7
This problem is further compounded by the difficulty experienced
by the courts in applying and defining the standard of gross negli-
gence.13 At the root of this problem is the difficulty of formulating an
objective standard by which the jury can determine, as a matter of
fact, whether or not a defendant has been grossly negligent. Many
courts,19 including Virgima,2 0 maintain that there is a difference in
(1952); Roanoke Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Whitner, 173 Va. 253, 3 S.E.2d 169 (1939);
Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 17o Va. 486, 197 S.E. 438 (1938).15Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917); Jones v. Massie, 158
Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63 (1932); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 3o, 16o S.E. 77 (1931). See
note 14 supra.
6Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1934); Cosgrave v. Molstrom,
127 N.J.L. 505, 23 A.2d 288 (i941).
'-See note 27 infra.
"Chicago, R.I. & P Ry. v. Hamler, 215 IL. 525, 74 N.E. 705 (19o5); John v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 42 Mont. 18, ii1 Pac. 632 (191o); McAdoo v. Richmond & D.R.R.,
io 5 N.C. 140, 11 S.E. 316, (189o); Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Oho
St. 567, 2oo N.E. 483 (1936); Ketchmark v. Lindauer, 198 Va. 42, 92 S.E.gd 286
(1956); Prosser, Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 91 (1933).
"Wilhite v. Webb, 253 Ala. 6o6, 46 So. 2d 414 (195o); Bedwell v. De Bolt,
221 Ind. 6oo, 5o N.E.2d 875 (1943); Titus v. Lonergan, 322 Mich. 112, 33 N.W.ad
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kind between acts which are grossly negligent and those which are
wilful and wanton. But the nature of this difference is not easily as-
certainable and at least one writer has concluded that Virginia courts
in particular have failed to grasp this distinction.21 The only agree-
ment the courts have reached in the area is that gross negligence is
something greater than ordinary negligence,22 which does little to
dispel the aura of confusion surrounding the term. Nonetheless, the
fact that the definition and application of the term "gross negligence"
have been extremely difficult both for the courts and the juries is hard-
ly to be doubted. 23 This is not to imply that standards of ordinary
negligence are entirely certain and definite. But the additional division
of an already indefinite standard can only result in increased con-
fusion among courts and juries.
On the other hand, the Restatement rule,24 has the merit of being
relatively clear and precise. This rule, by virtue of its clarity and pre-
cision, is not likely to result in confusion in the minds of the jury,
while an instruction on gross negligence, accompanied by a nebu-
lous and uncertain standard, is likely to have the opposite result.
For example, in the instant case, the jury could readily find that
Allen knew or should have known of the condition and failed to
warn Mrs. Smith. Under the Restatement rule this would settle
the liability. However, under a gross negligence instruction, the
jury would then have to decide if knowledge of the condition and
failure to warn the guest amounted to gross negligence as defined by
the court..
The Restatement theory of liability is substantially the standard
of reasonable care in specific terms, though in all cases it exonerates
the host from the duty of inspection. Since state courts are not
bound by federal precedent dealing with state law, it would seem
that it would be preferable for the Virginia court, when confronted
685 (1948); Ressmeyer v. Jones, 210 Minn. 423, 298 N.V 709 (1941); Sorrell v.
White, 1o3 Vt. 277, 153 At. 359 (1931).
"°Ketchemark v. Lindauer, 198 Va. 42, 92 S.E.2d 286 (956).
2 1Light, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 42 Va. L. Rev. 1197 (1956).
2Steambolt New World v. King, 570 U.S. (16 How.) 260 (1853); Dickerson v.
Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 1 z8 AtI. 518 (1922); Thompson v. Ashba, 122 Ind. App.
58, 1o2 N.E.2d 519 (1951); Nadeau v. Fogg, 145 Me. 1o, 7o A.2d 73o (1950);
McLean v. Triboro Coach Co., 3o2 N.Y. 49, 96 N.E.2d 83 (195o). See also Prosser,
Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955).
2wThis fact has led the legal writers to condemn almost unanimously the doc-
trine of degrees of care. Eldridge, Modern Tort Problems § 1o (1941); Harper &
James, Law of Torts § 16.13 (1956); Pollock, Torts 353 (14th ed. 1939); Prosser, Torts
§ 33 (2d ed. '955); Salmond, Torts § 121 (ioth ed. 1945)..
24See note io supra.
1962] CASE COMMENTS 261
with a case similar to Smith v. Allen, to adopt the Restatement rule
on both practical and theoretical grounds. Though the gross negli-
gence rule is firmly cntrenched in Virginia law concerning guests in
automobiles, the similarity between social guests in automobiles and
those on land is not so striking as to demand a uniform rule. Many
statutes, in fact, have different theories of liability to cover the two
situations.2 5 Moreover, consistency is not all important where the
extension of a rule of law would tend to be unjust and impractical.
Though Virginia has never passed on a case involving the problem
presented in Smith v. Allen, such cases are appearing in the United
States courts with increased frequency,26 perhaps due to the spread
of liability insurance to cover such situations.27 If the present trend
holds true the likelihood is that in the future Virginia courts also
will be called upon to deal with this problem with frequency.
There has been an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the rigid
and arbitrary classifications concerning the social guest.28 A recent New
Jersey case set up reasonable care as the duty owed by the host to his
guest.2 9 Yet, essentially the social guest is still the invitee who is not
an invtee,30 even though such "business visitors" may offer no shade
of pecuniary benefit to the host.31 Perhaps the only way to do justice
2For example Delaware, Florida, Ohio and Washington have "guest" statutes
requiring the automobile guest to prove gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct in order to impose liability on the host. Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 61oi
(1953); Fla. Stat. § 320.59 (1956); Ohio Rev. Code § 4515.02 (Baldwin 196i); Wash.
Rev. Code § 46.o8.o80 (1957). These same states have held that a possessor of
land must use reasonable care to warn against or remove defects which he knows
are likely to cause harm to his social guests. Maher v. Voss, 46 Del. 418, 84 A.2d
527 (1951); Goldberg v. Strauss, 55 Fla. 254, 45 So. 2d 883 (195o); Scheibel v. Lipton,
156 Ohio St. 3o8, 1O2 N.E.2d 453 (1951); McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wash. 2d 864, 233
P.2d 852 (1951).
mCompare the great number of recent cases in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952),
with the earlier lack of authority in annotations 12 A.L.R. 987 (1921), 92 A.L.R.
1oo5 (1934).
-Professor Harper suggests that their increased frequency is due to the spread
of liability insurance. Harper & James, Law of Torts § 27.1 (1956). The great
number of cases in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952) between members of the same
family suggests that these suits are not truly adversary.
' Laube v. Stevenson, a Discussion, 25 Conn. B.J. 123 (1951); McCleary, The
Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land,
i Mo. L. Rev. 45 (i936).2'Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (ig6i).
nOThe term "invitee" seems to indicate that a social guest would fall squarely into
this category. For a discussion of this anomaly see Prosser, Business Visitors and In-
vitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573 (1942).
"Those classified by the courts as invitees include many groups of visitors
who do not confer discernible benefits upon the host. Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128
Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942); Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital, io3 Conn. 520,
